Leadership for Nation Building: the Case of Korean Presidents[1]

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Introduction

South Korea (Korea hereafter) has represented one of the most successful cases in the history of nation building. The country, known as "an East Asian model of economic prosperity and political democracy,"[2] emerged as a modern nation in a single generation and under the most trying circumstances—the legacy of colonial rule, national division, the Korean War and continual confrontation with the Communist North. Its success in nation building is extraordinary, not only in the history of this country, but also in comparison with other third world countries.

However, Korea continues to be regarded as a country of "missing leaders." Images of presidents in Korea are largely negative. Compared with other Asian democracies, Koreans' distrust of their leaders and government is exceptionally high.[3] It is a great irony that the country's nation building is lauded while the presidents who largely engineered it are blamed or distrusted. This negative view is not based on a balanced evaluation of their presidencies; despite the central role of presidents in Korean nation building, no systematic study of its presidential leadership exists.[4] Does all this mean that South Korea has achieved its phenomenal success without leadership; certainly not. South Korea's politics is leader-centric: the presidency has been the heart and mind of the country.

Leadership matters, particularly in developing countries. In the early stage of nation building, state institutions may be impressive on paper but ineffective in practice. New states usually have inadequate capability dealing with the demands and challenges facing them. Nation building is a long-term, arduous process of creating and strengthening self-sustaining national infrastructure, including security and political institutions as well as a socioeconomic foundation. Its challenges are so daunting and perilous that it is almost impossible for an ordinary leader to effectively attend to multiple and contending issues, and succeed.

In a typical new state, expectations are high, but state capacity is low. Its leaders thus become easy targets of criticism. Only a strong, effective and visionary leader can overcome the difficulties and succeed in tackling the many tasks of nation building. Nevertheless, few analysts have systematically considered the difficult tasks and constraints with which leaders of those nations must contend.

This article attempts to examine the leadership role Korean presidents played in the process of nation building.[5] To this end, it will first review previous research on leadership, examine the common problems facing third world countries, and identify the specific tasks of nation building in these countries. It will then explore a theoretical perspective linking leadership to successful nation building, and apply the perspective to the evaluation of Korean presidents.[6] A key finding is that attributes of "good" leadership differ at different stages of national development. This must be taken into account when assessing the qualities of individual presidents in the recent history of Korea and elsewhere.

The Role of Leadership for Nation Building

Nation building is viewed in this study as the long-term internal process of building the social, economic and political foundations of a state—a process of self-sustaining national development.[7] This view differs from the commonly used notion equating it merely with short-term efforts to stabilize a failed, or failing, state and creating or strengthening that state's government institutions through outside intervention, a narrow view of military occupation, peacekeeping, and reconstruction that is often used interchangeably with state building.

In recent years the meaning of the term nation building has shifted from its traditional sense of creating nationhood toward the concept of post-conflict state formation. Thus most recent literature on nation building focuses on the security implications of failed or weak states.[8] Here, nation building is seen primarily as an international security issue rather than a domestic developmental one. Historically, however, 'nation building' by military force usually fails. The recent intervention in Iraq illustrates how haphazard and unfocused 'nation building' is in

practice. Whereas a strong indigenous state capacity is almost always a requirement for successful nation building, building this capacity may be a challenge beyond the capacity of outsiders. Critics of 'nation builders' argue that it is arrogant to suppose that outsiders can build a nation or spread democracy.[9] Effective state institutions historically evolve originally out of a nation's social structure, cultural norms, and distribution of political power. Therefore, political engineering by outsiders seldom succeeds in radically altering the underlying conditions responsible for a state's ineffectiveness.

In other words, nation building is more than just short-term post-conflict state formation or state building. Fukuyama discusses two phases of nation building: its first phase consists of post-conflict reconstruction; the second phase "consists of creating self-sustaining political and economic institutions that will ultimately permit competent democratic governance and economic growth."[10] In this paper, state building is viewed as the initial phase of nation building. While in Europe nation building historically preceded state building, in post-colonial states, state building preceded nation building.[11]

A stronger state does not emerge in time in the natural course of nation building. Nation building generally assumes that someone is doing the building intentionally. It is a difficult and long-term process with high costs in manpower, lives, and resources.[12] It requires building a society, economy, and polity that will meet the basic needs of the people.[13] The long-term success and viability of an emerging nation depends on the nature and quality of its leadership. Leadership is essential to providing purpose and direction during the process of nation building. A new nation may falter without capable, legitimate, and visionary leaders.

During periods of crisis and historical change, the quality of a nation's leaders can prove decisive. During the most challenging period in its history, Korea produced some extraordinary leaders. Together, they protected the nation from Communist threat, created an economic miracle, and built a dynamic democracy. The United States has intervened and/or acted as an occupation authority in some developing countries where it has pursued nation building activities. Unlike these cases, Korea's success in nation building is its own; it is the result of Koreans' own efforts rather than those of the United States.

While some countries such as Korea have succeeded in nation building, many others have stagnated or regressed. Why and under what circumstances do some states succeed, while others do not? What sort of leadership is most effective in nation building, and how does such leadership differ from that of a stable democracy? In order to answer these questions, analysts need to situate themselves more firmly within the context and from the point of view of the leaders of third world states.

Existing Research on Political Leadership

In developing countries, there has been a tendency for social scientists to apply Western standards of leadership to the study of their political leaders without due consideration of the historical, economic, social, and security realities in which their governments have operated.[14] In such studies, the countries have generally been regarded as "normal" states—not much different from a Western democracy, that is, generally socially stable, economically prosperous, and politically institutionalized and mature. It may be argued that like most new states Korea during the early decades of its history was located at the other end of the extreme—highly vulnerable in terms of security, socially chaotic, economically poor, and politically underdeveloped. Nevertheless, scholars and writers of leadership in Korea and other third world nations tend to remove leaders from their particular contexts. But by removing leaders from their particular contexts and evaluating them in isolation, researchers have failed to provide a comprehensive and balanced account of the role such leaders have played.

Studies of leadership in developing countries have been most heavily influenced by American scholarship. As a result, they tend to be highly critical of the governments and political leaders of developing countries. But the United States is exceptional in many ways. In particular, the country was born through a revolution against state authority. There are, therefore, many differences distinguishing the U.S. from other countries: the United States is consistently more antistatist, individualistic,

laissez-faire, and egalitarian than other democracies.[15] "When an American thinks about the problem of government-building," as Huntington puts it, "he directs himself not to the creation of authority and accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power.… [He] is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies with restriction on government."[16] Blessed with economic plenty, social well-being, and political stability in the United States, American political science has been indifferent to political development and leadership, which handicaps the country in assisting the political development of developing nations. [17] As a result, political leaders of developing nations are generally viewed as illegitimate or undemocratic, without giving due consideration to the possible necessity of power and authority to national stability and development.

Thus, existing scholarship on leadership tends to insist on democratization before the rest of the state apparatus is in place. However, it appears equally necessary to build a state before beginning the process of democratization. It is wrong to view democratization as a component of the process of state building, because the democratization effort assumes that functioning state apparatuses are already in place.[18] A more practical question is whether, as parts of the nation building effort, democratic processes are so important in principle that they should be encouraged regardless of consequences. Democracy in the initial stages of development may in fact have a destabilizing effect; the introduction of a democratic system will either decrease state capacity or generate demands for new types of state capabilities that are weak or even nonexistent.[19] As a matter of fact, political participation and demands are usually growing more rapidly than governmental capability to meet them, overloading the government and at times leading to breakdown and chaos. Until the mid-1980s, the failures of democracy were more the rule than the exception among developing nations.[20]

Therefore, before a country can become a democracy it must have coherent, effective administration. [21] Thus, Fukuyama argues that state building (i.e., strengthening state capacity) is one of the most important issues for the world.[22] Krasner and Pascual also believe that creation of the institutions of a market

democracy—or fostering the "supply side" of governance— is a fundamental requirement of nation building.[23]

Existing leadership studies on developing nations also reveal a methodological weakness: a researcher will typically apply a trait or institutional approach which limits the scope of his or her study. The trait approach focuses on the personalities of individual leaders.[24] A fault in this approach is its emphasis on the "individual" himself, rather than on the individual as a factor within a unique social and political milieu. Another problem with this approach is its tendency to project blame for the failures and ailments of the nation on the leader, without understanding the circumstances in which that leader operated.

In an institutional approach it is assumed that the nature of a leader's role is determined in large part by the constitution and laws that define it, and by a well-established political process.[25] This approach focuses on interactions between the chief executive and other political institutions, such as the legislature, political parties, and other politically relevant organizations. However, institutions are only one aspect of the leadership environment. More importantly, the underdevelopment of political institutions in third world nations poses a major challenge to applying the institutional approach to the study of its leaders. Indeed, almost by definition in third world states the leader precedes the emergence of mature political institutions. In Montesquieu's dictum, "at the birth of societies, it is the leaders of the commonwealth who create the institutions; afterwards it is the institutions that shape the leaders." [26] Similarly, Benjamin and Duvall argue that in well-developed polities leaders are "constrained by the institutional-legal order," while in a developing society they are "the shaper of the emerging institutional-legal order."[27]

A Theoretical Framework of Leadership for Nation Building

The nature and process of nation building are not well understood. Nation building is creating something where once was nothing. As Machiavelli noted, "There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things."[28] Even under the best of conditions, nation building is a

difficult task. Thus, only a few states have succeeded in nation building while many others have failed, even collapsed.[29] Since the early 1990s, we have witnessed serious crises in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Afghanistan. There are many failed leaders and even today many nations are experiencing a leadership crisis. In those nations, weak, incompetent, or nonexistent government is the source of the crisis. However, the problems of nation building have not been restricted to third world states. The European state-building experience was much more violent and top-down than is commonly acknowledged.[30] Therefore, the ability to create missing state capabilities and institutions is critical to nation building.[31]

The colonial legacies of many third world states makes their nation building more challenging than in the case of Western states. These countries were often created arbitrarily and without the prerequisites for long-term internal and external security. The result was the creation of many quasi-sovereign states—states possessing the nominal features of statehood but lacking the functional capabilities, including the capacity to ensure internal and external security.[32] Thus, emerging nations may be destined to pass through a period of turmoil, violence, and radical political experimentation on the road to social and political maturity.

Therefore, in order to explore and appreciate leadership for nation building, it is necessary to understand the challenges and problems leaders of third world nations generally face.[33] First of all, the most serious of these challenges is insecurity— a high degree of internal and/or external threat.[34] The underlying causes of insecurity include the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions, as well as regimes, inadequate societal cohesion, and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization, all of which are related to the process of state building and its corollary, nation building.

The second most common problem facing developing societies is poverty. Thus, late industrializers feel strong economic pressure toward a centralization of political and economic institutions. Often the choice is presented to and by

regimes as one entailing a trade-off between the advantages and hopes of prosperity under conditions of order and the disadvantages of unregulated "democracy" and disorder.[35] As Thomas puts it, "The right to vote does not necessarily guarantee people the right to food, shelter, and the basic necessities of life."[36] Thus, East Asian "developmental" states usually have strong or even authoritarian governments.[37]

Finally, the time required to successfully complete nation building differs fundamentally between the West and the Third World. The tasks of nation building, which in the West were accomplished over long stretches of time in an evolutionary manner, in the Third World must be completed in a revolutionary way, within a few decades, and under more complex and difficult circumstances. Whereas Western states had time to solve some of the worst problems of nation building before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics, nation building in the developing nations has no such luxury.[38]

In many developing nations, weak, incompetent, or nonexistent government is the source of social and political crisis, and lack of leadership is a common problem of government failure. There are many failed leaders and even today many nations are experiencing a leadership crisis. A recent analysis of policy failures in Latin American countries concluded: "Enhancing governance and strengthening accountability remain the defining challenges of Latin American unstable democracies. Government ineffectiveness and ineptness are major source of ungovernability."[39]

Thus, students of the third world posit the centrality of state building in the political life of their own states.[40] To this end, three primary functions of state building are emphasized: to protect people and property (law and order and national defense), to establish government institutions and formulate policy (policy capacity), and to extract resources to support governmental activities and provide public services (taxation or extraction). Raju Thomas considers military security, economic development, and political democracy as the three essential pillars of a nation.[41] A good government is one that provides peace, security, minimal levels of material and psychic satisfaction, and that

makes progressive efforts to solve existing and emergent problems.[42]

Thus, the author suggests three major tasks of leadership for nation building in general:

- *national security* (internal and external security)
- *economic welfare* (economic development and public services such as education)
- *political development* (individual rights and political capacity)

The political capacities of new states, which struggle to promote these tasks of nation building, are often overloaded by the many problems and challenges confronting them. An ordinary approach is usually inappropriate under such extraordinary conditions. There is a hierarchy or priority among these three tasks of nation building.[43] The relative importance of these factors differs by time (within a society) and place (among societies at the same time). In their study of the challenges faced by Japan and Turkey in achieving nation building, Ward and Rustow suggest that these nations faced four sequential crises: a crisis of national identity, the critical need for self-defense against external enemies, the need for economic development, and the need for political development.[44] Thus, in transitional societies priority setting is much more important than it is in Western democracies.

Nothing else can be considered more critical to a state than the provision of national security. Security is a necessary condition for state building. Without the assurance of national security, the pursuit of other nation-building goals, such as economic growth and democratization, is difficult, if not impossible. [45] Not surprisingly, political leaders of newly independent states are preoccupied, even obsessed, by the survival of their states, and security considerations commonly dominate their domestic and foreign policies, often to the sacrifice of economic and democratizing issues.[46]

Once a nation's security is assured, that nation then needs to develop an economy strong enough to provide for the basic needs of its people. Economic security in a third world state is often a life-or-death matter: economic growth, development, and capital accumulation are more important than issues of social equality and distributive justice, which are major concerns of democratization. As Benjamin and Duvall point out, in developing nations "social inequality is a necessary and hence acceptable byproduct of development: turmoil with respect to social inequality is a fully unacceptable threat to social order, to be met with the full force of the state."[47] A study of ninety-eight countries came to the conclusion that "among the poor nations, an authoritarian political system increases the rate of economic development, while a democratic political system does appear to be a luxury which hinders development."[48]

Political development, a long-term, gradual process, is the third requirement of a modern nation. Only once a society reaches a degree of economic development wherein the majority of its populace enjoys a comfortable standard of living does democracy become a major concern. Thus the irony that to the degree an authoritarian leader succeeds in overcoming national insecurity and poverty, it becomes more difficult for him to justify his rule. However, introducing democratic institutions in developing countries is no easy task, and even when such institutions are established it is difficult to sustain them. Undoubtedly, security pressure is not the only force that prevents democracy from taking root. Poverty, illiteracy, the lack of political maturity and experience, or the tradition of authoritarian rule contributes to the difficulties of establishing and sustaining democracies. As James Madison warned in *The Federalist*, No. 51, "you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place it to control itself."[49] In most developing nations, governments have been unable to perform the first function, much less the second.

Democracy presupposes the presence of minimal economic autonomy to exercise political rights: the higher the socioeconomic level of a country, the greater the chance that it will be able to sustain a democracy.[50] When a society reaches a degree of economic development where the majority of the populace enjoys a comfortable life, democracy becomes a major concern. The priority of economic growth and social order comes under challenge when subordinate citizens and groups

demand social equality and distributive justice. In addition, if authoritarian leaders succeed in overcoming insecurity and poverty, it becomes more difficult for them to justify their rule.

Leadership is a function of its situation; it is contingent on the interaction between the leader and the environment in which the leader operates.[51] Different historical, social and political contexts make different demands on leaders; what may be effective or advantageous leadership for one society may be disadvantageous for another. In other words, leadership tasks in developing nations are quite different from those encountered in Western democracies; consequently, leadership strategies and styles must differ.[52] In order to understand and evaluate third-world leaders, we need to pay more attention to their extremely challenging leadership environments.

In a developing nation, situational factors tend to exert a greater influence upon a leader's behavior than the leader's personality or political institutions. Therefore, a "situational approach" is more appropriate in leadership studies of developing nations.[53] The most popular situational approach is the contingency theory of leadership effectiveness developed by Fred E. Fiedler. According to Fiedler, leadership effectiveness is the result of interactions between the style of the leader and the characteristics of the environment in which the leader works.[54] He argues that under uncertain or difficult situations a task-oriented and authoritarian style of leadership is more effective than a relationship-oriented (democratic) style. In an unstable environment, where leader-follower relations are poor, tasks are unstructured, or a leader's legitimacy is weak, a strong and task-oriented leader who gets things accomplished proves to be the most successful.

As discussed, developing countries face many concurrent problems and challenges. Such extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary leadership. In Western democracies, what Burns called "transactional" (democratic) leadership is likely appropriate.[55] In third world countries, where circumstances are uncertain and unfavorable and radical change is required, "transformational" or charismatic leadership is the type more likely to succeed.[56]

A political leader in a developing country faces many problems and challenges. Does the leader actively make his environment, or is he/she passively made by it? In other words, whether the leader is active or passive will make a great difference in nation building. An active leader is more likely to be motivated, determined and decisive. Such a leader is also more likely to tackle the difficult tasks of nation building successfully. On the other hand, a passive leader is cautious and more likely takes a "wait-and-see" or laissez-faire approach. Rather than promoting his goals of nation building, such a leader will likely allow him to be pushed and manipulated by political enemies and pressure groups. In short, an active leadership style is crucial for successful nation building.

In poor countries, effectiveness is usually more important than legitimacy. As Woo-Cumings puts it, "legitimacy occurs from the state's achievements, not from the way it came to power."[57] In those nations, people are preoccupied with the basic needs of everyday life; political and administrative institutions are underdeveloped and human resources are inexperienced. Nation building requires good governance; the ability to create missing state capabilities and institutions and to improve living conditions is critical to nation building, and leadership plays an important role in good governance. In other words, organizational and managerial talent is also crucial for successful leadership.

In nation building, leadership style and managerial skills are arguably two of the most important elements. In terms of leadership style and managerial skill, we may divide leadership into four general types—inactive, operational, frustrated, and effective (see Table 1).[58]

Table1. Types of Leadership for Nation Building

Leadership Style	Managerial Skill	
	Low	High
Passive	Inactive Leadership	Operational Leadership
Active	Frustrated Leadership	Effective Leadership

Usually surrounded as he is by a hostile environment and daunting challenges, an inactive leader is likely to be a failed leader. An operational leader is more likely pressured to follow policies his opponents want than initiating and promoting his own agenda. An active leader who has ambitious goals but does not know how to achieve them likely becomes frustrated. An active leader with managerial talent will more likely have a reasonable vision, choose practical goals, and likely prove more successful than the other leader types. In developing nations, a determined and managerially talented leader, or in Cyril Black's term 'modernizing leader,' will likely be more successful.[59]

Considering challenging leadership environment and daunting leadership tasks in third world states, several criteria for the evaluation of political leaders of developing nations are suggested.[60] First, a leader of a new nation needs to provide a vision for the future of that nation. An inspired vision serves to strengthen national unity and galvanize popular support for, and participation in, nation building. Second, with limited political and economic resources, major tasks of nation building cannot be solved concurrently. Therefore, agenda and priority setting is crucial to successful leadership. Third, a successful leader requires qualities that guarantee successful implementation of nation-building policies. Such qualities include the ability to make sound appointments, managerial skill and personal commitment. In addition, nation building, which in the West was accomplished over centuries, must be completed in a few decades and under more difficult circumstances. To overcome the inertia and resistance of existing institutions, a successful leader must be highly motivated and forceful, one who can mobilize and concentrate resources to effectively implement his policies. Fourth, skill in crisis management is a critical quality, as internal and external threats to stability can be both sudden and lethal. Finally, in developing nations, where legitimacy and loyalty are not deeply rooted, integrity can cement popular trust and support for the leader.

The Case of Korean Presidents
Problems of Nation Building

The challenges in nation building Korea faced after 1948 were more daunting than those many new nations have faced. The country suffered not only from the common problems of new nations but also national division, the devastating Korean War, and the heavy burden of national defense owing to continuous military confrontation with the Communist North. In order to examine Korean leaders, particularly earlier presidents, it is important first to evaluate the challenges they faced.

To begin with, the division of the country made the problems of identity and legitimacy serious ones. A sense of national identity had already been fatally damaged by colonial rule. Shortly following liberation, national partition and the establishment of an independent government in the southern half created a serious identity and legitimacy crisis. North Korea has always been seen as both an enemy and a partner in reunification. Leftists and pro-unification groups in South Korea have always questioned the legitimacy of the Korean government and its anti-Communist policies.

Second, like most third world states, insecurity has been a perpetual feature of life in Korea; a fact more clearly recognized by the rest of the world since the North Korean nuclear crisis of recent years. From its inception North Korea denied South Korea's authority and declared the elimination of the South Korean government as its primary national goal. Korea fought a bloody war, and since the armistice of 1953 has remained technically at war with the constant possibility of renewed conflict. Further, the North Korean regime has also aimed to bring the South under its rule through a strategy of "socialist revolution in the South."[61] Like Israel, South Korea has been a state under siege: the country has remained locked in conflict with North Korea that entirely denies South Korea's authority or even its right to exist at all. Until the early 1960s, therefore, survival and security had been the main concerns of the country.

Such a perilous security situation required the military to play a more critical role in Korea than in other developing nations. Considering Korea's unique security challenges, a leader with a military background ascending to the highest levels

of government may seem natural. However, Koreans, especially students and intellectuals, hold deeply rooted prejudices toward the military, and thus toward any general-turned political leaders.[62] In the tradition of Buddhism and Confucianism, the man of arms was considered inferior to the man of letters, whose role was often seen as that of ruling elite and who paid little attention to security.[63] During and after the Korean War, however, with massive support by the U.S., the Korean military was rapidly transformed into a modern institution in an otherwise underdeveloped country. After the 1961 military coup, Park Chung Hee and other former military leaders who were proud of the efficiency, advanced technology and discipline of the military, despised the civilian mentality of the old order. However, intellectuals and the opposition regarded rule by a general-turned-president, even if legitimately elected, as not only illegitimate but unqualified.

During and after the Korean War, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Moreover, economic growth in the country had more important implications than in other developing countries. Economic performance was seen as a barometer in gauging the superiority of the two competing ideologies of the North and the South. In 1960, per capita income in the South was 80 dollars, while the North's figure was 208 dollars.[64] Korea had to move fast; without strong action to halt the economic stagnation and lingering social and political unrest, unification of the peninsula might well occur on terms favorable to the North. The survival and legitimacy of Korea depended upon decreasing the South-North economic gap. Korean leaders had to demonstrate the effectiveness of a non-Communist path to economic development and military security.[65]

Although the three national goals of nation building (national security and stability, economic growth, and democracy) have competed in Korean politics throughout its post-1948 history, the priority shifted from the achievement of security and stability to that of economic prosperity, and finally to an extension of political liberty. This sequence of priorities allows development to be completed in stages—conditions for the success of each stage being built upon the one preceding it.

An understanding of the interplay among issues of security, economic growth, and political development is necessary before an analysis of Korean leadership is more fully articulated. Western-style democracy was hurriedly transplanted in 1948 onto a debilitated and inhospitable Korean political soil that had known no self-government for thirty-six years. Militaristic colonial rule had replaced an incompetent and tottering Confucian feudal dynasty. The newly introduced democratic principles were nearly the opposite of the premises upon which life had been built for most Koreans up to the moment of independence. Korean trials and errors in democracy were perhaps inevitable.

Korea's continuous and rapid economic growth at the expense of democratic principles produced a seriously unbalanced society, one that was economically developed but politically immature and generating powerful pressures for democratization.[66] This imbalance led to serious tensions, and ultimately to a crisis of legitimacy which led to the transition to full democracy. In 1988, the first year of the Roh Tae Woo administration, the country's per capita income reached $4,000—the level at which Adam Przeworski and his colleagues suggest, "Democracy is almost certain to survive."[67] In the late 1980s, Koreans also witnessed the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe, weakening and strategically isolating North Korea and reducing that country's security threat toward Korea. It was at this time that democracy became the most pressing national goal, a goal that could no longer be delayed in the name of national security and economic development.

Previous Scholarship

Korean presidents who overcame daunting challenges and succeeded in nation building have been underestimated, mainly due to the lack of appropriate criteria for evaluation. There is a tendency to approach the study of Korean presidents from American liberal perspectives, without giving due consideration to the historical, economic, social, and security realities in which Korean presidents operated.[68]

American influence has been far more strongly felt in Korea than in any other new nation. During the three-year American

occupation following liberation in 1945, Americans imposed their standards and institutions, including their presidential system. The Korean War and its legacy made Korea dependent upon continued American assistance and advice. Despite the enormous gap between American ideals and Korean realities, foreign scholars and journalists paid little attention to the difficulties and challenges Korean leaders faced, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. They wrote of Korean leaders in terms of biased stereotypes, reinforcing unfavorable images. Korean intellectuals tend to reflect these Western views, and to evaluate and criticize their leaders using American liberal democratic standards. It is no surprise that Korean presidents fall short of their expectations. As Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, once said, "Most of the governments in the world are, by American standards, bad governments. Democracy has been rare in the world."[69]

In fact, leaders alone were not responsible for the failures of Korean democracy. Clinton L. Rossiter suggests three types of threats to democracy—war, economic catastrophe, and social unrest.[70] Inexperienced and resource-poor Korean governments struggled with all of these threats during the early period of the Republic. No government anywhere in the world could deal adequately with such a set of compounded problems. Koreans had accepted democratic principles enthusiastically, not fully understanding what these meant or implied. Deviation from the ideal model of democracy has often been blamed on flaws of government and its leaders.

Nevertheless, most Korean and foreign views on Korean politics and leadership tend to focus on democracy, to the neglect of security and economics–critical issues in Korean politics.[71] Not a single Korean college political science textbook contains a chapter (or even a section) dedicated to a discussion of these issues. It is astonishing that security has been almost totally neglected in the study of Korean leadership, even in assessments of Syngman Rhee, who struggled against a Communist-led insurgency and the Korean War throughout his presidency.

Evaluation of Presidents

There has been a tendency to define Korean politics from a Western liberal perspective in terms of a simple dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship. Thus, Korean presidents of earlier decades were regarded as "dictators", or at best "developmental dictators." However, the evaluation of Korean presidents in terms of the theoretical perspective in this paper will arrive at different results.

It was argued earlier that leadership effectiveness is the result of leadership style and the characteristics of the environment in which the leader works. From the perspective of leadership for nation building, a leader is likely to be more successful if the leader can meet the challenges his nation faces and contribute to achieving the timely task of nation building. Earlier, the author suggested four types of leadership for nation building—inactive, operational, frustrated, and effective (Table 2). It is argued that an active and managerially capable leader is likely to be an effective nation builder. Park Chung Hee, a man of strong will and commitment and of excellent managerial skills, succeeded in achieving his goals more effectively than other Korean presidents. To a lesser degree, Chun Doo Hwan, although politically controversial, demonstrated the same leadership strengths as Park. Unquestionably, the effectiveness of Park and Chun governments does not alleviate the question of the legitimacy of their presidencies.

Table 2. Leadership Patterns of Korean Presidents

Leadership Style	Managerial Skill	
	Low	High
Passive	Inactive Leadership (*Chang Myon & Choi Kyu Ha*)	Operational Leadership (*Roh Tae Woo*)
Active	Frustrated Leadership (*Syngman Rhee, YS Kim, DJ Kim & MH Roh*)	Effective Leadership (*Park Chung Hee & Chun Doo Hwan*)

On the other hand, Syngman Rhee, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun were ambitious and determined, but found themselves frustrated, mainly owing to a lack of

managerial skills, including poor priority setting and personnel management. A top executive of a modern nation manages a very complex organization, called government, under very uncertain and rapidly changing environment. Therefore, good organizational management is essential to successful leadership. Recent presidents (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun), who were long-term anti-government fighters, were anti-bureaucratic, anti-government, or both, maintained the mentality of pro-democracy struggle and mismanaged the government, greatly disappointing Korean people.[72]

Chang Myon (a short-term premier after the 1960 student uprising) and Choi Kyu-ha (an interim president after the death of Park Chung Hee) may be examples of inactive leaders. Chang was both cautious and lacking in managerial capability, unable to control his divided administration as well as to meet challenges following the 1960 student uprising. Choi was too passive and indecisive to manage the crisis in the wake of Park Chung Hee's death. By contrast, another general-turned-president, Roh Tae Woo, was an operational leader. He had administrative skills but was passive. Rather than demonstrating true leadership, he allowed himself to be pushed and manipulated by his political enemies and activist groups.

Good management is essential to successful political leadership. Organizational and managerial skills are especially important for the leaders of developing nations because political institutions and the policymaking process are not well established. Both Park and Chun managed the government by institutions rather than personal whim. These two leaders learned organizational and managerial skills during military careers and established strong, effective national management teams by recruiting capable technocrats.[73] The best presidents are ones who surround themselves with the best advisers. In his memoirs, Dwight Eisenhower emphasized the importance of organizational ability: "Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent, nor make the decisions that are necessary to trigger actions, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster."[74]

In contrast, recent three presidents (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun), who were proud of their democratic legitimacy, are often regarded as "failed" and/or "imperial" presidents. According to a 2001 survey, a sizeable majority (82%) of Koreans believed Korean democracy to be in crisis, while a plurality of the respondents rated the Kim Dae Jung government more negatively than the authoritarian government of Chun Doo Hwan.[75] Three recent presidents pursued lofty goals such as democratic reform and social justice. There was a big gap between what they wanted to do and what they actually could achieve. They were radical reformists, but lacked the leadership skills to carry out their agendas. Anti-government struggle is one thing and governing is another. Their presidencies have been overshadowed by exceedingly poor appointments, mismanagement of the government, serious presidential personality and character flaws, and scandals. For a five-year single term president, there is no room for trial and error; unless he is well prepared and effective, his term is likely to be marred by mistakes and misjudgments he did not intend to commit.

There is no doubt that those three presidents made significant contributions to Korean democracy, the third task of Korean nation building. Popular elections do not always guarantee the selection of competent leadership. As Max Lerner wrote, "ideals and ethics are important as norms, but they are scarcely effective as techniques."[76] Questions of legitimacy and effectiveness are interrelated: even a legitimate government may lose its legitimacy if the regime is incapable of functioning, just as an illegitimate regime may become acceptable if it proves to be effective, and may purchase legitimacy by such prolonged performance.[77]

Korean and foreign experts alike have criticized Syngman Rhee, the first president and a strong anti-Communist leader during the Korean War, for his failure to establish a workable democracy, while paying little attention to the security dilemma he faced. In terms of leadership for nation building, he made a great contribution to national security, the most urgent requirement of nation building. Under an acute and constant security crisis throughout his presidency, Rhee's paramount priority was national survival. To him, without the assurance of national security the pursuit of other nation building goals was

nearly impossible.[78] As Rossiter suggests three types of crisis in democracy (i.e. war, rebellion and economic crisis), the Rhee government faced a war, internal and external threats, and deep economic crisis at a once while inheriting neither a democratic traditions nor any political institutions and with very limited resources and trained manpower.

Rhee's anti-Communist and security-first policies were well founded, considering the daunting challenges to the very existence of the Republic that were prevalent during his presidency. His preoccupation with unification may be viewed as an extension of his security policy. Rhee's leadership was relatively successful as he was able to prevail over the most critical national threats—Communist insurgencies, civil and military uprisings, and the Korean War. His stubborn demand for a U.S.–Korea security pact ultimately succeeded and guaranteed national security, economic growth, and democracy in coming decades.

In the previous section, the author suggested criteria to evaluate political leadership for nation building—vision, agenda setting, appointments, managerial skill, crisis management, commitment, integrity, and achievement. Table 3 shows the results of the author's evaluation of seven Korean presidents based upon these criteria. [79] How long a Koran president remained in power makes a difference in terms of his performance. Three earlier presidents (Rhee, Park, and Chun in power for 12, 18, and 7 years respectively) had enough time to build basic national infrastructures. Recent presidents since Roh Tae Woo have served single 5-year terms, making it difficult for them to make significant achievements.

Table 3. Overall Evaluation of Korean Presidents

Vision	Rhee	Park	Chun	TW Roh	YS Kim	DJ Kim	MH Roh
Agenda Setting	3	3	1	1	2	2	1
Appointments	2	3	2	1	2	2	1
Managerial Skills	1	3	3	2	1	1	1
Crisis Management	2	3	3	1	1	2	1
Commitment	3	3	3	1	3	3	1
Integrity	1	2	1	1	2	1	2
Achievement	2	4	3	2	1	2	1

Notes: excellent=4; good=3; average=2; below average=1

The author emphasizes that agenda setting, managerial and organization skills, and appointments are important qualities of leadership for nation building. It is no surprise that Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan made greater achievements than other presidents, as they were superior in these qualities. Such leadership is vital in developing nations, where leaders attempt to promote short-cut modernization under difficult circumstances.

Leadership has been a lingering issue in South Korea for last two decades. Ineffective leadership is a large part of the answer. Future leaders should learn the lesson that a single term presidency has no time for trial and error. In order to be successful, a president must be well prepared and effective: needed is a pragmatic agenda with clear policy priorities, a capable national management team, systemic management of the government, and proactive role of the president. A president should not underestimate the strengths and achievements of his predecessors and work on the foundation built by them and try to solve problems and improve conditions in a mature fashion.

Conclusion

In this paper, nation building is seen as a developmental problem rather than an international security issue. Three major tasks of nation building—internal and external security, economic growth, and political development—are identified. Faced with obstacles and challenges as well as limited state capacity, the priority in nation building should be in the order of security, economy and democracy. It is assumed that good governance by effective leadership is a requirement of successful nation building. Unlike a typical liberal democratic approach to political leadership, the perspective explored in this paper pays attention to the important tasks of nation building, such as security and economic growth, given their importance in developing nations. During the early stage of nation building, a leader needs to succeed in tackling insecurity and poverty. Such a leader has to be strong and task-oriented. It is argued that Korean nation building was successful because the country had

strong and/or effective leaders and because they focused first on the most urgent tasks in nation building.

This article, therefore, evaluates and reaches conclusions regarding Korean presidents that are significantly different from other existing views. Although there are some debatable elements in this perspective, it provides a more balanced view on Korean leaders and politics. During the most difficult and challenging period in its history, South Korea produced some extraordinary leaders. Together, they preserved the nation from Communist rule, created "the miracle on Han," and built a dynamic democracy. Within a half-century, South Korea was transformed from a country of dire poverty to one of relative well being, from post-colonial chaos to dynamic democracy, from an underdeveloped society to a post-industrial one, and from a client state to a key economic and political powerhouse in East Asia.

It is fair to say that each Korean president made different contributions to nation building. Syngman Rhee promoted security-oriented policies and helped preserve the country from Communist takeover, succeeding the first task of nation building–security. Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan pushed economy-first policies and achieved a "miracle on the Han," which provided favorable conditions for improving national security and developing democracy, thus succeeding in the second task of nation building–economy. Since the late 1980s, based on the economic and social foundations established by their predecessors, Roh Tae Woo and his successors succeeded in the transition to full democracy, the third task of nation building. Although the seven presidents pursued different goals and strategies, their presidencies appear to be complementary in terms of nation building. It is concluded that since Korea tackled tasks of nation building in the order of urgency from security, economy to democracy, the country could succeed in nation building more effectively than any other developing nation.

The case of Korea has valuable implications for other developing nations, not only because the country has succeeded in nation building but also because almost two-thirds of the earth's population continues to struggle for security, stability, prosperity, and democracy. Nation building efforts in weak or

failed states by outside powers may need to pay greater attention to creating the basic national infrastructures of those states, such as security and administrative institutions, as well as establishing economic foundations.

The world is witnessing numerous failures in nation building, and such a phenomenon is a serious global concern. In a developing state, appropriate leadership can make the difference between steady progress and early ruin. In a world undergoing revolutionary technological change and globalization, the call for good leadership has been ubiquitous. The more rapid the process of nation building, the more urgent that need.

Notes:

[1] Prepared for the Conference on "Korea in the World: Democracy, Peace, Prosperity and Culture," the World Congress for Korean Studies 2007, Busan, Korea, August 23-25, 2007.

[2] *New York Times*, December 26, 1995, A14.

[3] According to a 2004 World Economic Forum survey among sixty countries carried out by Gallup International, Koreans' criticism about the dishonesty of political leaders (85%) registers one of the highest percentages. Other countries higher than Korea were: Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Bolivia, Peru, India, and Poland, see <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/B205AC764B>.

[4] Despite the importance of political leaders in developing nations, serious works on the presidency or presidential system outside of the United States are limited. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* focuses exclusively on the United States.

[5] For a comprehensive study of Korean presidents see Choong Nam Kim, *The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building* (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007).

[6] Although Korea is now regarded as a developed nation, its past was that of a typical third world state.

[7] The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development defined nation building as: "Equipping First Nations with the institutional foundation necessary to increase their capacity to effectively assert self-governing powers on behalf of their own

economic, social and cultural objectives." See
<http://ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/res_main.htm>.

[8] For example, see Mark T. Berger, "From Nation-Building to State-Building: the Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order," *Third World Quarterly* 27:1 (spring 2006); Ekbladh, David, "How to Build a Nation," *Wilson Quarterly* 28: 1 (spring 2004); Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) and *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); R. S. Jennings, *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation-Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003); Payne, James L., "Deconstructing Nation Building," *The American Conservative* (October 24, 2005); Minxin Pei and S. Kasper. 2003. *Lessons from the Past: the American Record on Nation Building* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003); and Talentino, Andrea Katyryn, "The Two Faces of Nation-building: Developing Function and Identity," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17: 3 (fall 2004).

[9] Kate Jenkins and William Plowden, *Governance and Nationbuilding: the Failure of International Intervention* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006); and Pei and Kasper, *op. cit.*.

[10] Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101," *Atlantic Monthly* (January/February, 2004), p. 159.

[11] Carolyn Stephenson, "Nation Building," http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation_building/.

[12] Fukuyama (2004), p. 162.

[13] Stephenson, *op. cit.*

[14] Gunar Myrdal writes, "social science 'models,' more or less appropriate to Western experience, are uncritically applied to non-Western developmental situations." *Asian Drama* 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 73.

[15] Seymour M. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: Norton, 1995).

[16] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 7.

[17] Glenn D. Paige, *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 11-40; and Huntington, *op. cit.,* pp. 5-7 .

[18] "Sustaining Global Democratization: Nation Building and Intervention," *ISD Report*, February 2003, Georgetown University, p. 7.

[19] Fukuyama, *State-Building*, p. 15.

[20] Of 93 cases Linz and Stephen studied, there are 37 cases of stable democracy and 55 cases of democratic breakdown. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978); and Alan. Siaroff, "Premature Democracies: the Promotion of Development and Political-Cultural Factors," *Third World Quarterly*, 20: 2 (summer 1999), pp. 405-419.

[21] See Huntington, *op. cit.*; Peter Baker, "The Realities of Exporting Democracy," *Washington Post*, January 25, 2006; and T. Carothers, "It's too soon for democracy," *Washington Post*, July 20, 2003.

[22] Fukuyama, *State-Building*, ix.

[23] Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs* 84: 4 (2005).

[24] James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992).

[25] Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1988); and James P. Pfiffner, *The Modern Presidency* (New York: St. Martin, 1994).

[26] Quoted in Danwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1967), p. 135.

[27] Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," in Roger Benjamin and Stephen I. Elkin, eds., *The Democratic State* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1985), pp. 42-45.

[28] George Bull, *The Prince* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 51.

[29] Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, 89 (1992-93), 3; and Robert I Rotberg, ed., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003) and *When States Fail* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[30] Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[31] Fukuyama, *State-Building*; and Joel S. Midgal, *Strong Societies, Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[32] Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991), pp. 65-69; and Brian Job, ed., 1992. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1992), pp. 24-29.

[33] Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young. *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), pp. 8-11.

[34] Ayoob, Mohammed, *The Third World Security Predicament*: *State Making, Regional Conflict, and the* International *System*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1995); Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World*: *The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1988).

[35] Job, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[36] Raju G. C. Thomas, *Democracy, Security, and Development in India* (New York: St. Martin, 1996), p. 5.

[37] Thomas S. Axworthy, "Democracy and Development: Luxury or Necessity," in Kenneth E. Bauzon,

ed., *Development and Democratization in the Third World* (New York: Crane Russack, 1992).

[38] Ayoob, *op. cit.*; and Stein. Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variation within Europe," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 598-599.

[39] C. Santiso, "Another lost decade? The future of reform in Latin America," *Public Administration and Development* 23 (2003).

[40] Ayoob, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

[41] Thomas considers military security, economic development, and political democracy as the three essential pillars of a nation. For detailed analysis of their relationship in India, see Raju G. C. Thomas, *Democracy, Security, and Development in India*.

[42] Tsurutani, Taketsugu, *The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies* (New York: Chandler, 1973), pp. 175-179.

[43] Rotberg, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[44] Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rostow, eds.,. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 465-466.

[45] A majority of American survey historians approved of their president using whatever force was necessary to halt the imminent overthrow of government (Murray & Blessing, 63).

[46] Job, *op. cit.*, p, 28; and Ayoob, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

[47] Benjamin and Duvall, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

[48] Robert M. Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer Developing Nations?" *Comparative Social Research*, 2 (1979), p. 244.

[49] Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[50] Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53: 1 (1959), p. 75; and Rose E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: the Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review*, 88 (1994), pp. 903-910.

[51] Robert Elgie, *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies* (New York: St. Martin, 1995), pp. 7-8.

[52] Bryan D. Jones, ed., *Leadership and Politics* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), p. 89.

[53] Robert K. Murray and Tim H. Blessing, *Greatness in the White House: Rating the Presidents* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1941).

[54] Howard Elcock, *Political Leadership* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 92-93; Jerry L. Gray, and Frederick A. Starke, *Organizational Behavior* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1988), p 264; and Robert T. Justice, "Leadership Effectiveness: A Contingency

Approach," *Academy of Management Journal* 18: 1 (1975), pp. 160-166.

[55] James McGregor Burns, 1978. *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 5.

[56] In the United States, charismatic presidents were ranked high (Murray and Blessing, *op. cit*., pp. 40-41).

[57] Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 53.

[58] For types of American presidential leadership, see Richard Rose, "Evaluating Presidents," in George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Researching the Presidency* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 453-484; and Marcia Lynn Whicker and Raymond R. Moore. 1988. *When Presidents Are Great* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988). There are relations between the criteria for leadership evaluation and a typology of leadership. Crisis management (or decisiveness) and commitment are qualities that make a leader active or passive. Agenda setting (or priority setting) and appointments are leadership qualities closely associated with managerial skill.

[59] Black suggests three outstanding characteristics of a modernizing leadership: "the assertion on the part of political leaders of the determination to modernize," an effective and decisive break with the institutions associated with a predominantly agrarian way of life," and "the creation of national state with an effective government and a reasonable stable consensus on the part of the inhabitants as to ends and means." See, Cyril Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 71-72.

[60] For literature on evaluating American presidents, see Neustadt, *Presidential Power and Modern Presidents*; Gary Maranell, "The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the Schlesinger Polls," *Journal* of *American History* 57 (1970), 104-113; and Simonton, *Why Presidents Succeed*. Greenstein suggests six qualities of an effective president: communication to the public; organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence (Greenstein 2000: 178-185). Based on American criteria, Hahm uses such items as leadership quality, personality, intelligence, morality, democratic leadership, vision, appointments, crisis management, and achievement (Hahm 1999).

[61] Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty* (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2004), chapter 8.

[62] Gregory Henderson, *Korea: the Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 334-38; and Se-jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), chapter 4.

[63] At the time of Korea's annexation by Japan in 1910, only 5,000 ill-equipped, poorly trained soldiers attempted in vain to defend the country against the Japanese military takeover.

[64] Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, *Two Koreas in Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), p. 66.

[65] Hilton L. Root, *Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 149.

[66] Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds. *Reexamining Democracy* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992).

[67] Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), P. 273.

[68] There is no comprehensive study of Korean presidents in English. Typical liberal views of Korean presidents are found in John K. Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) and Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: Norton1997).

[69] Quoted in Richard M. Nixon, *Leaders* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), p. 340.

[70] Clinton L. Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 6.

[71] Victor Cha, "Security and Democracy in Korean Development," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *Korea's Democratization*, 201.

[72] The problem of anti-bureaucratic, anti-government leadership is succicintly analyzed in Water Willimas, *Mismanaging America: The Rise of the AntiAnalytic Presidency* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990).

[73] In numerous annual surveys conducted over the last eighteen years, Park has been number one among all past Korean presidents, always receiving top ranking by more than two-thirds of respondents. Supporters of the Chun Doo Hwan-style authoritarianism as the best method of tackling the country's serious problems increased steadily from 12 percent in 1996, to 24 percent in 1998, 31 percent in 1999, and 44 percent in 2001. See Doh C. Shin, "Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea," in Samuel S. Kim, ed. (2000), 63.

[74] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), p. 114.

[75] Doh C. Shin, "Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea," in Samuel Kim (2000), ed. *Korea's Democratization*, p. 65.

[76] In an introduction to Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourse* (New York, the Modern Library, 1950), iii.

[77] Meymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), pp. 82-83,

[78] Yong-Pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in Korea, 1953-1960 (*New York: St. Martin, 1967).

[79] The evaluations are based on the results of an internet survey between May 2004 and December 2006. The author sent an evaluation form to sixty Korean scholars and received evaluations from thirty-seven. Based on American criteria, Sung-Deuk Hahm also evaluated five Korean presidents. His criteria were vision, appointments, morality, crisis management, leadership quality, and achievement. Nevertheless, Hahm's results were similar to the author's. See Sung-Deuk Hahm, *Daetongryonghak* (The Korean Presidency) (Seoul: Nanam, 1999), p. 291.